The Civil War in the LOW Area

by Arnold Chase and Richard Lindenauer

The Wilderness

In the 1860's, the whole area south of the Rapidan from Germanna Ford east to a farmhouse and inn known as "Chancellorsville" (at Virginia routes 3 and 610) and south to Catharpin Road just south of the Po River was known as the Wilderness, being covered with a mass of thick woods and dense underbrush. Passage through the area was exceedingly difficult, except on the few roads that existed, including the Germanna Plank Road (Route 3), the Old Orange Turnpike (Route 20), the Orange Plank Road (partially covered by Route 621), and Brock Road (Route 613). Henceforth, these roads will be referred to by their present-day designations. There also was an unfinished railroad that roughly paralleled Route 20, the right-of-way of which permitted maneuvering of troops. A less likely site for a major battle could hardly have been found, and yet this was the site of two important battles of the Civil War, the Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863, and the Wilderness Campaign in May 1864.

The Battle of Chancellorsville (1863)

While the Battle of Chancellorsville, occurring so nearby, undoubtedly is of considerable interest to property owners at Lake of the Woods, involvement of our immediate area was limited to the passage of a part of the Federal forces along Route 3 to Chancellorsville. There was no actual fighting, other than small skirmishes this side of Route 613, which is about 5 1/2 miles away. Most of the Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph Hooker had crossed the Rapidan and the Rappahannock further down at Ely's Ford and U.S. Ford in an attempt to outflank Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, cut it off from Richmond, and destroy it in the field. As students of history know, the battle resulted in defeat and withdrawal back across the Rappahannock for the Federal forces, primarily because of Hooker's vacillation. Jackson's surprise flank attack also was a factor.

One point of special interest was located nearer to Lake of the Woods - just east of Wilderness Run. It was the site of a Conferderate field hospital, adjacent to Wilderness Tavern, where Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. ("Stonewall") Jackson's amputation took place. The Tavern still stands in an unrestored condition beside the eastbound lane of Route 3 just after one crosses Wilderness Run. The somewhat dilapidated building is privately owned, but the fact that it was the Wilderness Tavern Has been authenticated by a team of architects, according to the National Park Service. A marker at this site prior to extension of the four-lane highway on Route 3 was removed when the new road was constructed two years ago and has not been replaced. Jackson's arm was buried in an old cemetery near the Lacy house just a short distance off Route 20. Its burial place is reported to have been reconfirmed a number of years ago by a detachment of Marines and is presumed to be still there.

The Wilderness Campaign (1864)

It remained for the Wilderness Campaign, in May 1864, to mark the immediate Lake of the Woods area as a major battleground of the Civil War. Even in that campaign, the fiercest fighting took place south of Route 20, after the first day as a result of the strategy adopted by both Grant and Lee.

When Lee fell back from his defeat at Gettysburg, he established the military frontier of Virginia along the Rapidan-Rappahannock line, taking advantage of the natural barriers afforded by these rivers. He set up headquarters for the Army of Northern Virginia at Orange Court House, with Longstreet's I Corps about 12 miles northeastward between Clarks Mountain and Racoon Ford on the Rapidan.

The Army of the Potomac under Meade was assembled in early May 1864 around Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station, with Burnside's independent IX Corps still further up the railroad toward Catlett Station. Grant, who had just been named Supreme Commander of all the Federal forces, attached his field headquarters to that of Meade's command where he could monitor and coordinate the movements of the IX Corps and the Army of the Potomac. The latter included Hancock's II Corps, Warren's V Corps, and Sedgwick's VI Corps. Grant was determined to march against Lee's army, "attempting to turn him by one flank or the other." The lines of march and strategy adopted indicated that he expected to turn Lee's right, just as Hooker had tried a year earlier.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC MOVES INTO THE WILDERNESS

Early on May 4, the Army of the Potomac moved into the Wilderness in two parallel columns. Wilson's 3rd Cavalry Division, Warren’s V Corps, and Sedgwick’s VI Corps crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford and moved on toward the Wilderness Tavern. Greggs’s 2nd Cavalry Division, Hancock’s II Corps, and the Artillery Reserve crossed at Ely’s Ford, moving toward Chancellorsville. According to their marching orders for the day, ultimate deployment lines for both columns were further south around Parker’s Store and Todd’s Tavern, which would have placed them well on their way through the Wilderness on more favorable terrain. From there, Hancock and Warren were to provide the turning force, while Sedgwick held the pivot, and Burnside moved down across Germanna Ford to protect Meade’s rear.

However, the columns cane to rest in mid-afternoon amid indications that Meade became worried about having them proceed too far ahead to be in a position to assure protection of the very long wagon trains of supplies which were crossing at Ely’s Ford and Culpeper Mine Ford. This delay, enabling Lee to move his forces further north, resulted in the engagement being fought in the Wilderness, rather than in the more open country farther south. While Warren’s Corps had moved past Route 20 to Wilderness Tavern, Sedgwick’s Corps remained on Route 3 between Germanna Ford and Flat Run. Hancock’s Corps stopped around Chancellorsville, and Burnside’s Corps was still up around Rappahannock Station, about 15 miles away.

Countermoves by the Army of Northern Virginia

Meanwhile, the Army of Northern Virginia was moving into position from Orange Court House and Gordonsville. Lee sent Ewell up Route 20 past Robinson’s Tavern at Locust Grove to a high ridge now traversed by Hill-Ewell Drive. He sent Hill up the Orange Plank Road toward the New Hope Church, to be joined later by Longstreet moving up Marquis Road. At this point, intelligence available to Lee left him uncertain whether Grant’s strategy was to turn westward toward Mine Run, or to proceed down river toward Fredericksburg. The fact was that ten Federal divisions were poised between Wilderness Tavern and Chancellorsville, while Lee had only five until Longstreet could come up. Lee, of course, was not in a position to press the battle at this stage, on the late afternoon of May 4, 1864, but he did order Ewell to engage the enemy wherever he found them.

Hancock and Warren resumed their march toward the original lines of deployment early on the morning of May 5, but Griffin’s division, moving down Route 20 on Warren’s right, quickly encountered Ewell’s forces. When this information reached Warren and Meade, the latter gave orders for Hancock to halt his advance at Todd’s Tavern (Route 613 at Catharpin Road), and for Warren to attack. There is no definite information that Grant approved these orders before they were given, but it is known that he subsequently agreed with the order for Warren to attack.) Warren established his headquarters at the Lacy House, which was located about 400 yards south of Route 20 just a short distance from its intersection with Route 3. The Lacy House, Ellwood, is now owned by the National Park Service and is planned for restoration.) Meade and Grant set up Army Headquarters on Route 20 at the top of the first knoll just up from the same intersection.

Sedgwick moves into Lake of the Woods Area

Having spent the night encamped about where our boat & recreational vehicle parking area is located now, Sedgwick began to move down Route 3. His lead (2nd) division under Getty was approaching Route 20, while Wright’s 1st Division was just reaching the intersection with the Culpeper Mine Road. At that time, his orders were changed, sending him down that road toward Route 20 to support the right flank of Major General Griffin’s Fifth Corps, which was already heavily engaged with Ewell’s forces. The Culpeper Mine Road was little more than a trail through the woods, but traces of it are still visible, even though a large part of it was obliterated by construction of the Lake of the Woods golf course and roads. This road crossed the Rapidan River at the Culpeper Mine Ford, crossed Route 3 in the general vicinity of the Lake of the Woods Hardware Store, skirted Musket Lane, went diagonally across the 17th fairway on the golf course, and followed the ridge to the left of the 18th fairway past our Pro Shop to the 1st green. From there, it crossed the 8th tee and the 7th fairway, followed the ridge between the 5th and 6th fairways, crossed the 6th tee, and exited Lake of the Woods at Mansion Court off Gold Valley Road. It continued on through what is now the Wilderness National Military Park, bisecting the battle area, and finally intersected Route 20. It was partially restored by young men who occupied a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) Camp in the park area during the 1930s, and is clearly visible today. In fact, riders from our stables use parts of it as riding trails.

A skirmish between advance elements of Wright’s division and Confederate Cavalry (probably the 1st North Carolina) took place just behind our present golf course maintenance shop, which probably explains the existence of trenches in that area. As Wright pushed slowly down the Culpeper Mine Road, being delayed by Confederate forces following guerilla tactics, he posed a threat to Johnson’s Division on Ewell’s left. At this point, Ewell redeployed Hays’ and Pegram’s brigades of Early’s Division on the left of Johnson’s Division and issued orders for all units to entrench along this line. Thus, preparations of the Confederate trenches were instituted early in the afternoon of May 5th. In reaching their positions, Hays’ and Pegram’s Brigades undoubtedly traversed our Tall pines area (Section 5) and support units probably were located back over Monticello Circle.

By mid-afternoon, after sharp skirmishing in the dense woods along the way, Wright had reached a position opposite Johnson’s augmented Division between Route 20 and Culpeper Mine Road. Neill’s Brigade from Getty’s Division and Seymour’s Brigade from Ricketts’ Division were made available to Wright to support his right flank extending toward Flat Run (now the LOW Main Lake). No artillery support was provided to Wright. However, Grant did direct Major General Burnside to place one of his IX Corps division at Sedgwick’s disposal for operations against Ewell’s left, and Burnside selected Potter’s 2nd Division. Thus, the Union battle line involving our immediate area extended from a point about even with the intersection of Lakeview Parkway and Tally-Ho Lane southward to Route 20. Sedgwick set up the VI Corps Field Hospital in an area across Lakeview Parkway from Spottswood Park. The Confederate battle line extended roughly along the top of the ridge from behind our stables to Route 20.

Wright’s Attack is Stalled

While savage fighting raged south of Route 20 during the early afternoon, it was not until mid-afternoon that a serious encounter erupted between Upton’s Brigade and Stewart’s Brigade just north of Route 20. Upton reported that, as a result of the fire fight, the woods in front of and around his position were burning at that the ground was strewn with the wounded and dead who could not be removed. Wright then attacked all along the line, but his right hit Johnson’s entrenched line and recoiled. Hays’ Louisiana Brigade then hit Russell’s and Neill’s Brigades just south of our stables area, but was repulsed.

By 5:00 p.m. Seymour’s Brigade arrived and was ordered to turn Ewell’s left. His attacked moved from about Gold Valley Road up to the ridge south of the stables, but then faltered partly because Neill had failed to move forward to protect his flank. The fighting came to an end about 9:00 p.m. all along the front, without any decisive results by either side.

The Second Day of Battle

Early the next morning, Ewell’s artillery opened fire, and Early’s infantry on the Confederate left moved out of their trenches across the swampy ground which is now in our lake bed, from around Manassas Point down the lake to a point about opposite the intersection of the first entrance of Madison Circle with Lakeview Parkway. They carried a fierce attack against Neill’s and Seymour’s Brigades on the Federal right but were repulsed. A counterattack by Neill and Seymour was accompanied by a simultaneous attack all along the VI Corps front. However, Wright’s Division was unable to carry the Confederate entrenched positions.

The battle surged back and forth for some time with the Confederates holding their original line. Thereafter, for the remainder of the morning, a stalemate existed along the lines north of Route 20, while savage fighting continued to rage further south. At mid-morning on May 6th, Sedgwick’s forces began to prepare trenches.

One of the purposes of entrenching was to enable Wright to hold the line while Sedgwick made reinforcements available to Warren south of Route 20, where he and Hancock were hard –pressed by Longstreet’s attacking forces. This battle reached a climax about 4:30 p.m. and a stalemate about an hour later. Gordon’s attack on Sedgwick’s right which rested on Flat Run (now at the bottom of our main lake), therefore, was something of an anti-climax.

Gordon’s Flank Attack

Gordon’s Brigade had been shifted from its position on Ewell’s right, (south of Route 20) the previous day, all the way over to Ewell’s left astride of Flat Run. Shortly thereafter, Johnston’s Brigade from Rodes’ Division came in on the extreme left, so that he and Gordon overlapped the Federal line. Observing this situation, Gordon proposed to Ewell that he undertake a flank attack. Ewell was impressed with the proposal, but would not approve until he could consult with Early, Gordon’s Division Commander, who was not immediately available.

When Early was consulted (about mid-morning), he opposed the attack for reasons which appeared to him at the time to be valid, and Ewell concurred in his decision. Subsequently, the situation changed so that Early approved Gordon’s plan, but by then it was nearly sunset. Nevertheless, Gordon advanced from his trenches and formed his brigade in a field where Lake of the Woods Sections 8 and 9 are now located. He was supported by Johnston’s four North Carolina units.

Shaler’s Brigade, which had been moved in on Seymour’s right about where Tally-Ho Lane intersects Lakeview Parkway, had neither the tools nor the time to dig trenches. In fact, legend has it that they were busily engaged in butchering cattle when Gordon observed them in the forenoon. At any rate, they appear to have been almost totally unprepared for the impending attack, despite Shaler’s entreaties to Seymour for support.

Gordon attached about 6:00 p.m. across what is now the area of the Madison Circle intersection with Lakeview Parkway opposite the stables. They soon rolled back Shaler’s slender line, and Johnston’s North Carolinians moved around Shaler’s rear. At the same time, Pegram’s fine Virginia regiments struck diagonally across Seymour’s front. As Shaler and Seymour gave way, Neill threw a line across the line of Gordon’s assault which, with the help of Shaler’s and Seymour’s Brigades, stopped the advance. However, both Shaler and Seymour were captured. An attack by Pegram’s Brigade, ordered by Early, missed its target in the gathering darkness, and the whole flank attack stalled. Gordon, thereupon, returned to his trenches.

The principal result of Gordon’s flanking maneuver appears to have been to hasten a decision by Meade to move his right flank (Sedgwick’s VI Corps) to a position along the watershed between the upper course of Caton Run (Keaton’s Run) which now feeds our fishing lake, and Wilderness Run. By the morning of May 7th, they had withdrawn to this strong line of defense and entrenched there. Warren’s V Corps pulled back along Route 20 to make a continuous line with Sedgwick’s left, and Burnside adjusted his line accordingly. The VI Corps trenches are still clearly visible in the National Military Park along the ridge between the southern leg of Eastover Parkway and Route 20. The Confederate lines moved up to positions along the Culpeper Mine Road, where they dug some entrenchments.

For all practical purposes, the Battle of the Wilderness was over. Grant counted about 18,000 casualties and Lee about 11,000. From here, the contest between Grant and Lee moved on to Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna, Cold Harbor, Petersburg – and finally Appomattox.

* * * * *

For those interested in a comprehensive treatment of this subject, the award-winning book by Gordon C. Rhea titled The Battle of the Wilderness – May 5-6, 1864, published in 1994 by the Louisiana State University Press, is highly recommended.